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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Two Jinn, Inc. ("Two Jim") appeals: (1) the district court's denial of Two Jim's 
Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture and Exonerate Bond; and (2) the district court's denial of 
Two Jinn's Motion to Reconsider Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture and Exonerate Bond. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Statement of Facts 
The State of Idaho agrees with Two Jinn's statement of the General Course of 
Proceedings. Appellant's Brief, pp. 1-2. 
In addition to the information contained in Two Jinn's statement of the General 
Course of Proceedings, the State notes that Two Jinn did not surrender the defendant, 
Roderick Brown, to the county in which the bench warrant was issued; rather, Two Jinn 
had no information regarding Mr. Brown's extradition from Texas and presented no 
evidence that it had any involvement in the extradition or transportation of Mr. Brown to 
Ada County. Tr., 11/20/08, p. 2; Tr., 12/3/08, pp. 1, 10-12, 18-19, 24-26. Mr. Brown 
appeared before the district court on October 23,2008 only after having been booked into 
the Ada County Jail on October 18,2008. R. 5,72-73,78. 
11. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Did the district court correctly conclude that Idaho Criminal Rule 46(g) 
did not mandate exoneration of the bond at issue in this appeal? 
B. Did the district court appropriately exercise its discretion in denying Two 
Jim's Motion to Reconsider Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture and Exonerate Bond? 




The district court properly denied Two Jim's Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture and 
Exonerate Bond and its subsequent Motion to Reconsider Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture 
and Exonerate Bond. R. 93-103, 128. Appropriately reading former Idaho Code 5 19- 
2927 and former Idaho Criminal Rule 46(g)' in conjunction with one another, the district 
court held that exoneration of a bond, following forfeiture, was only appropriate if the 
defendant appeared in court within 180 days of the forfeiture of the bond and could 
either provide a satisfactory excuse for his prior failure to appear or had been surrendered 
by the party who posted bail. R. 96-101; I.C. 5 19-2927 (2007); I.C.R. 46(g). 
Neither Two Jinn nor Mr. Brown offered any admissible evidence that Mr. Brown 
had a satisfactory excuse for his prior failure to appear in court or any evidence that Two 
Jinn surrendered Mr. Brown to the jail facility of the county which issued the bench 
warrant for Mr. Brown's arrest or otherwise had any involvement in securing Mr. 
Brown's appearance in court. R. 100-01; Tr., 11/20/08, p. 2; Tr., 12/3/08, pp. 1, 10- 
12, 18-19, 24-26, 28. Because neither of these conditions was satisfied, the district court 
properly denied Two Jim's motions seeking exoneration of the bond. R. 93-103, 128. 
As is discussed in detail below, the district court reasonably interpreted Idaho 
Code 5 19-2927 and Idaho Criminal Rule 46(g) to be consistent with one another and 
intended to be applied together. R. 96-100. Even if the statute and the rule were deemed 
' The Legislature recently enacted the new Idaho Bail Act, while the ldaho Supreme Court 
adopted a new Idaho Criminal Rule 46, both of which became effective July 1, 2009. This case, 
however, is governed by the former Rule 46 and former Idaho Code $ 19-2927. 
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to conflict with one another, however, the district court properly held that the conflict 
would involve a substantive matter, and that the statute's specific requirements for 
exoneration of a bond would therefore prevail. R. 98-100. 
B. Standard of Review 
"The construction and application of legislative enactments and, by analogy, court 
rules are questions of law over which [this Court] exercise[s] free review." Hansen v. 
State, 138 Idaho 865, 868, 71 P.3d 464, 467 (Ct. App. 2003); see also E. Idaho Econ. -
Dev. Council v. Lockwood Packaging Corn. Idaho, 139 Idaho 492, 495, 80 P.3d 1093, 
1096 (2003). 
"A decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration generally rests inthe 
sound discretion of the trial court" and is therefore reviewed by this Court for an abuse of 
discretion. Straub v. Smifh, 145 Idaho 65,71, 175 P.3d 754,760 (2007). A review of the 
district court's exercise of discretion involves consideration of whether the district court 
"correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, whether it acted within the boundaries of 
its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards, and whether it reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason." Reed v. Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 56, 44 P.3d 1108, I I I I 
C. The District Court Correctly Concluded that Idaho Criminal Rule 46(g) Did 
Not Mandate Exoneration of the Bond 
In the proceedings below, the district court properly determined that Idaho 
Criminal Rule 46(g) did not entitle Two Jinn to mandatory exoneration of the bond at 
issue simply because the defendant, Roderick Brown, appeared in court within 180 days 
of the entry of forfeiture, given that Two Jinn did not surrender Mr. Brown to any Idaho 
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peace officer and did not offer a satisfactory excuse for his prior failure to appear. R. 96- 
101; see also TI., 11/20/08, p. 2; TI., 12/3/08, pp. 1, 10-12, 18-19,24-26. 
At the time of the district court's decision to deny exoneration of the bond, 
"forfeiture, relief from forfeiture, and exoneration of bail [welre governed by statute, 
Idaho Code $ 19-2927, and court rule, Idaho Criminal Rule 46." State v. Quick Release 
Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho 651,653, 167 P.3d 788,790 (Ct. App. 2007). Former Idaho Code 
$ 19-2927 provided, in relevant part: 
If, without sufficient excuse, the defendant fails to appear before the court 
upon any occasion when his presence has been ordered the court must 
immediately direct the fact to be entered upon its minutes, order the 
forfeiture of the undertaking of bail, or the money deposited instead of 
bail, as the case may be, and order the issuance of a bench warrant for the 
arrest of the defendant. . . . If at any time within one hundred eighty 
(180) days after such entry in the minutes the defendant appears and 
satisfactorily excuses his neglect, the court shall direct the forfeiture of 
the undertaking or the deposit to be exonerated. 
If within one hundred eighty (180) days of the date of forfeiture, a 
person other than the defendant, who has provided bail for the 
defendant, surrenders the defendant to the jail facility of the county 
which issued the warrant, the undertaking of bail or deposits are thereby 
exonerated. 
I.C. $ 19-2927 (2007) (emphasis added). Idaho Criminal Rule 46(g) provided, at that 
time: "If the defendant appears or is brought before the court within one hundred eighty 
(1 80) days after the order forfeiting bail, the court shall rescind the order o f  forfeiture and 
shall exonerate the bond." I.C.R. 46(g). 
The district court appropriately concluded that Idaho Criminal Rule 46(g) must be 
applied in conjunction with the requirements of Idaho Code $ 19-2927. R. 98. In other 
words, Rule 46(g)'s general statement that the court shall exonerate the bond if the 
defendant appears in court within 180 days of forfeiture of the bond was subject to the 
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more specific requirements set forth in Idaho Code 5 19-2927, which provided that one of 
the following conditions must also apply: (1) the defendant must provide a satisfactory 
excuse for his failure to appear; or (2) the defendant must be surrendered to the jail in the 
county which issued the bench warrant by the party who posted bail for the defendant. 
LC. 5 19-2927 (2007); R. 98. 
In this appeal, Two Jinn argues that the district court's determination was in error 
for two reasons: (1) Two asserts that Idaho Code 5 19-2927 and Idaho Criminal Rule 
46(g) should be interpreted as alternative forms of relief from forfeiture; and (2) Two 
Jim argues, in the alternative, that the rule trumps the statute to the extent the two 
conflict with each other. Appellant's Brief, pp. 2-1 I .  As discussed below, however, the 
district court's conclusions were proper. 
1. The District Court Correctly Concluded that Idaho Code 6 19-2927 and 
Idaho Criminal Rule 46(d Did Not Conflict and Should be Applied In 
Coniunction with One Another 
"Where a statute and rule 'can be reasonably interpreted so that there is no 
conflict between them, they should be so interpreted rather than interpreted in a way that 
results in a conflict."' State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 974, 188 P.3d 912, 916 (2008), 
quoting State v. Currinaton, 108 Idaho 539, 543, 700 P.2d 942, 946 (1985) (Bakes, J., 
dissenting). The district court appropriately concluded that former Idaho Code 5 19-2927 
and Idaho Criminal Rule 46(g) were not in conflict with each other, but instead could be 
reasonably interpreted so that there was no conflict between them. Id. The court 
explained: 
In this case, the statute and rule can reasonably be read so as to not 
conflict. The difference between the rule and the statute lies in the 
statute's extra language requiring the defendant to satisfactorily 
excuse his neglect to be entitled to the exoneration of the bond if the 
RESPONDENT STATE OF IDAHO'S BREF ON APPEAL - 5 
defendant is not brought before the court by the person who posted 
bond. That this statutory language should be read to apply to the rule 
is both reasonable and appropriate to ensure that the defendant has the 
proper motivation for making a timely appearance as required by the 
conditions of his release on bond. . . . . In addition, allowing for an 
automatic exoneration within 180 days without requiring a satisfactory 
excuse would mean that the state could never recoup any of the money it 
spent within that time on administrative costs of handling the late 
appearance, investigative costs of trying to find the defendant, or 
extradition costs in bringing the defendant back to the state. Furthermore, 
reading this requirement of a satisfactory excuse into the rule does not 
negate or nullify any of the other language in the rule; it instead 
provides an important condition that must be satisfied before the 
mandatory exoneration can take effect. 
R. 98 (emphasis added). 
Two Jinn agrees that "the statute and rule can be reasonably interpreted so as not 
to conflict. . .." Appellant's Brief, p. 3. However, Two Jim offers its own interpetation 
of the statute and rule, an interpretation that is not, in fact, reasonable. Two Jinn asserts 
that Idaho Code 9 19-2927 and Idaho Criminal Rule 46(g) should be read to provide 
alternate forms of relief from forfeiture. Id. at 3-9. Specifically, Two Jinn argues that the 
statute and rule provide for exoneration "if the defendant appears before the court within 
180 days of forfeiture or . . . if the defendant appears and satisfactorily excuses his 
neglect." Id. at 4 (emphasis in original). 
Two Jinn's above reasoning is flawed, because interpreting the statute and rule as 
providing alternate forms of relief from forfeiture leads to a result that renders the statute 
ineffectual. According to Two Jinn's interpretation, a defendant could obtain exoneration 
of the bond by demonstrating that: (1) he appeared within 180 days of forfeiture and can 
provide a satisfactory excuse for his prior failure to appear, I.C. 19-2927; (2) he 
appeared within 180 days of forfeiture due to surrender by the person who posted bail, 
I.C. 5 19-2927; or (3) he appeared within 180 days of forfeiture, regardless of whether he 
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can offer a satisfactory excuse and regardless of whether he was surrendered by the 
person who posted bail, I.C.R. 46(g). In other words, if one of the purported alternate 
forms of relief is that the defendant need only demonstrate that he appeared within 180 
days of forfeiture, the statute's more specific conditions are rendered superfluous. Thus, 
Two Jim's interpretation of the statute and rule is not reasonable. See Farber v. Idaho 
State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 208 P.3d 289, 292 (2009) (noting that when interpreting 
statutes, the courts "must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute so that 
none will be void, superfluous, or redundant"); Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 
916, quoting Currington, 108 Idaho at 543, 700 P.2d at 946 (Bakes, J., dissenting) 
("Where a statute and rule 'can be reasonably interpreted so that there is no conflict 
between them, they should be so interpreted. .. .'3 (emphasis added). 
Two Jim relies heavily upon the newly-enacted Idaho Bail Act and new version 
of Idaho Criminal Rule 46, both of which became effective July 1, 2009, in order to 
support its argument that the former statute and rule were intended to provide altemate 
forms of relief from forfeiture. Appellant's Brief, pp. 4-9. However, the new Act and 
new Rule 46 are markedly different from the former versions that are relevant to this 
appeal. Under the new Act, a defendant can now seek to set aside forfeiture of the bond 
if he can offer a satisfactory excuse for his failure to appear, regardless of whether the 
defendant appears within 180 days of the forfeiture of the bond. I.C. 5 19-2916. 
Additionally, under the new Act and rule, a defendant can seek exoneration of the bond if 
he appears in court within 180 days of forfeiture, although the court can condition the 
exoneration of bail "on payment by the person posting bail of any costs incurred by state 
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or local authorities arising from the transport of the defendant to the jail facility of the 
county where the charges are pending." LC. § 19-2922(5); LC.R. 46(k). 
Contrary to Two Jim's assertion that the new Act and rule support the conclusion 
that the former versions of Idaho Code 5 19-2927 and Idaho Criminal Rule 46(g) were 
intended to provide alternate forms of relief from forfeiture, if anything, the new statutes 
and rule demonstrate the opposite conclusion. The new Rule 46(k) is substantively 
identical to the new Idaho Code 8 19-2922(5), as both provide that a defendant who 
appears in court within 180 days of forfeiture can seek exoneration of the bond, subject to 
payment by the person posting bail for any costs arising from the transport of the 
defendant. I.C. 5 19-2922(5); I.C.R. 46(k). The fact that the new rule and statute 
provide for a substantively identical form of relief from forfeiture indicates that the old 
rule and statute were intended to be applied together as a single form of relief from 
forfeiture, rather than as separate and alternate forms of relief. 
Furthermore, the content of the new statutes and rule support the conclusion that 
the former version of Rule 46(g) was intended to be subject to the conditions of Idaho 
Code 5 19-2927. As the district court articulated, applying the conditions of the statute to 
Rule 46(g) served the important purposes of ensuring that the defendant had proper 
motivation to make a timely appearance - and, by extension, that the person posting bail 
had the proper motivation to take measures to secure the defendant's appearance in court 
- as well as providing for the State to recoup any costs incurred by finding and 
transporting the defendant. R. 98; I.C. 8 19-2927 (2007) (providing for exoneration if 
the person posting bond surrenders the defendant within 180 days). The new Rule 46(k) 
and new Idaho Code 8 19-2922(5) ensure that the same important interests are served, as 
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the surety is motivated to locate and surrender the defendant within 180 days in order to 
receive exoneration of the bond, but is liable for any costs incurred by the authorities in 
securing the defendant's appearance if the surety was not the party to bring the defendant 
ins2 I.C. Cj 19-2922(5); I.C. R. 46(k). 
Two Jinn itself has acknowledged that "[tlhe primary rationale of bail forfeiture is 
. . . to create an incentive for sureties to take reasonable steps to recapture fugitive 
defendants." Appellant's Brief, p. 7, citing to State v. Ventura, 952 A.2d 1049, 1054 
(N.J. 2008). As is demonstrated by the facts of the case at hand, allowing exoneration 
under former Rule 46(g) in circumstances where the defendant has not offered a 
satisfactory excuse for his failure to appear and where the surety played no part in 
locating and transporting the defendant can result in a situation where the surety receives 
full exoneration in exchange for little effort on its part to fulfill its obligation of securing 
the defendant's appearance, while the State bears the full  costs of extradition andor 
transportation. The district court's interpretation of Idaho Code Cj 19-2927 and Idaho 
Criminal Rule 46(g) therefore supported the underlying purpose of forfeiture "to create 
an incentive for sureties to take reasonable steps" to secure the defendant's appearance. 
Id . R. 98; I.C. Cj 19-2927 (2007) (providing for exoneration where the surety surrenders 1, 
the defendant within 180 days). 
Two Jinn additionally argues that "to not recognize automatic exoneration 
pursuant to ICR 46(g) would lead to an absurd result" because former Idaho Code Cj 19- 
2925 provided that the surety could arrest the defendant for surrender "at any place 
Under Two Jinn's interpretation of former Idaho Criminal Rule 46(g), a surety could choose to 
delay taking measures to locate and surrender the defendant in the hope that law enforcement 
authorities would find and arrest the defendant within the 180 day period at no cost to the surety. 
This runs counter to one of the fundamental purposes of bail, which is to encourage the surety to 
fulfill its obligations under the bond to secure the defendant's presence in court, 
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within the state." Appellant's Brief, p. 8. Two Jinn therefore argues that "it would make 
no sense to require Two Jinn to arrest Mr. Brown while he was already in the Ada County 
Jail's custody, so ihat it could in turn surrender him thereto in order to get bond 
exonerated." Id. Contrary to Two Jinn's assertion, however, Two Jinn was not 
authorized by Idaho Code 5 19-2925 to arrest Mr. Brown after he had been brought into 
custody by law enforcement authorities. As this Court held in State v. Overby, Idaho 
Code 5 19-2925's provisions apply only to "surrender of the defendant before the 
forfiiture of the bond." -, 90 Idaho 41,4546,408 P.2d 155, 157 (1965) (emphasis 
in original). Thus Section 19-2925 did not authorize the arrest of Mr. Brown at the Ada 
County Jail following the forfeiture of the bond. E& id. Instead, Idaho Code § 19-2925 
is consistent with the position that one of the primary purposes of bail forfeiture is to 
serve as an incentive for the surety to take reasonable measures of its own to locate the 
defendant and secure the defendant's appearance in court, not to permit a surety to take 
advantage of the efforts and costs incurred by law enforcement officers by allowing the 
surety to "arrest" a defendant who has already been taken into custody. 
In summary, Two Jinn's interpretation of former Idaho Code 5 19-2927 and Idaho 
Criminal Rule 46(g) as separate and alternate forms of relief from forfeiture is not a 
reasonable interpretation, both because such an interpretation renders the statute 
ineffectual and superfluous and because such an interpretation is contrary to the 
underlying, important purposes of bail forfeiture. Two Jinn is correct that "the statute 
and the rule can be reasonably interpreted so as not to conflict" with each other, but the 
reasonable interpretation is that of the district court, which held that the specific 
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conditions set forth in Idaho Code 5 19-2927 applied to Idaho Criminal Rule 46(g). 
Appellant's Brief, p. 3; R. 98-101. 
As the district court appropriately held, when the statute and rule are considered 
together, it is reasonable to conclude that the general language of Idaho Criminal Rule 
46(g) contemplates the more specific requirements of Idaho Code § 19-2927. R, 96-101. 
In short, a reasonable interpretation of the statute and rule is that Rule 46(g)'s provision 
for exoneration within 180 days was subject to Idaho Code 5 19-2927's additional 
conditions that the defendant must provide a satisfactory excuse or that the defendant 
must be surrendered by the surety.3 "Where a statute and rule 'can be reasonably 
interpreted so that there is no conflict between them, they should be so interpreted rather 
than interpreted in a way that results in a conflict." Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d 
at 916, quoting Currington, 108 Idaho at 543, 700 P.2d at 946. The district court did not 
err in determining that Idaho Code 19-2927 and Idaho Criminal Rule 46(g) were not in 
conflict with each other, but should instead be read together to require the specific 
conditions for exoneration set forth in the statute. 
2. The District Court Correctly Concluded that Any Purported Conflict 
Between Idaho Code 6 19-2927 and Idaho Criminal Rule 46(e) Involved 
Substantive Issues and that the Statute Therefore Prevailed 
Even if Idaho Code 19-2927 and Idaho Criminal Rule 46(g) were deemed to 
conflict with each other, any such conflict would involve a substantive matter, and 
therefore, the statute would prevail. "When there is a conflict between a statute and a 
' This interpretation is consistent with the principle of statutory construction that "the more 
specific statute or section addressing the issue controls over the statute that is more general." 
Wheeler v. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 207 P.3d 988, 995 (2009). While 
the State recognizes that the case at hand involves comparison of a statute and a criminal rule, 
rather than two statutes, this basic tenet of statutory construction is informative on the issue of 
how a statute and a rule can be read together in a manner that incorporates the specific 
requirements of the statute into the more general provisions ofthe rule. 
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criminal rule, this Court must determine whether the conflict is one of procedure or one 
of substance . . ." Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916. Because "[tlhis Court's 
rule making power goes to procedural, as opposed to substantive, rules," if the conflict 
between a statute and rule is substantive, the statute will prevail over the rule. State v. 
Bicknell, 140 Idaho 201, 204, 91 P.3d 1105, 1108 (2004). "[LJegislation is a 
constitutional exercise of the Legislature's power to enact substantive law [and] that 
legislation is to be given due deference and respect." Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 
P.2d at 916, quoting In re SRBA Case No. 39576,128 Idaho 246,255,912 P.2d 614,623 
Although a clear line of demarcation cannot always be delineated between 
what is substantive and what is procedural, the following general 
guidelines provide a useful framework for analysis. Substantive law 
prescribes norms for societal conduct and punishments for violations 
thereof. It thus creates, defines, and regulates primary rights. In 
contrast, practice and procedure pertain to the essentially mechanical 
operations of the courts by which substantive law, rights, and remedies are 
effectuated. 
State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862,863-64,828 P.2d 891,892-93 (1 992) (emphasis added). 
In the proceedings below, the district court correctly held that former Idaho Code 
9 19-2927 dealt with substantive issues: 
The provision mandating exoneration is a substantive law giving the 
defendant or the bondsman the right or entitlement to the return of 
the money that was posted for bail. The statute defines when this 
right exists - when the bondsman brings the defendant before the 
court or when the defendant otherwise appears and satisfactorily 
excuses his neglect. How the court is to determine if the defendant has 
excused his neglect and how the court is to effectuate or actually cany out 
the exoneration of the bond are procedural issues - part of the mechanical 
operations of the court that are appropriately addressed by rule. 
R. 98 (emphasis added). 
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Two Jinn argues that any conflict between the statute and the rule instead involve 
procedural matters, asserting that Rule 46(g) should therefore trump Idaho Code 8 19- 
2927. Appellant's Brief, pp. 9-1 1. In so arguing, Two Jinn relies upon the case of 
v. Currin~ton for the proposition that all matters involving bail are "essentially 
procedural in nature." Appellant's Brief, p. 9; Currington, 108 Idaho 539, 700 P.2d 942 
(1985). Currington's holding, however, was narrow and is hot binding as to the 
circumstances presented here. The Currington Court held: 
, , 
We hold that as to the very narrow issue presented here, i.e., the 
authority of a trial court to allow post-conviction bail to a convicted 
criminal made ineligible for bail by a statutory enactment, the issue is one 
of procedure rather than of substantive law. 
Currington, 108 Idaho at 540-41, 700 P.2d at 943-44 (emphasis added). The Court 
distinguished post-conviction bail from pre-conviction bail, implying that pre-conviction 
bail involves a substantive right governed by the Legislature, rather than a procedural 
consideration left to the rule-making authority of the courts. Id. at 540, 700 P.2d at 944; 
see aIso id. at 542, 700 P.2d at 945 (Bistline, J., dissenting) (noting that "it makes little --- 
sense [for the majority] to concede that pre-conviction bail is a substantive right but post- 
conviction bail is a procedural matter.") 
The case at hand does not involve the issue of post-conviction bail, but instead 
involves the substantive right of the defendant or the surety to the return of money posted 
for bail under circumstances dictated by the Legislature. Accordingly, the discussions 
contained in the dissenting opinions of Currington are informative. "Bail issues involve 
far more than essentially mechanical operations of the courts by which substantive law, 
rights, and remedies are affected. Bail issues affect and involve rights of liberty, 
association, travel, and property. The inescapable conclusion is that bail is a matter of 
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substantive law." Id. at 543, 700 P.2d at 946 (Bistline, J., dissenting) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted.) 
There is no more compelling evidence that bail is a substantive issue than 
the fact that bail is guaranteed in both the eighth amendment to the United 
States Constitution, and Art. 1, Ej 6, of the Idaho Constitution. The issue of 
the right to bail requires a balancing of some of the most basic policy 
considerations confronting any democracy, i.e., the individual's right to be 
free from interference and incarceration by government, and the demand 
that society be protected from criminals and that persons be punished for 
societal misconduct. Those policy judgments are the most basic of the 
substantive law issues which are established by Constitution and statute, 
even though individual cases must be tried in the courts and thus there will 
always be certain procedural aspects to determining whether a given 
individual is entitled to bail, such as the type of hearing, notice 
requirements, evidentiary and burden of proof standards, etc. The fact that 
this Court can make procedural rules regarding the conduct of hearings 
regarding bail does not mean that the legislature does not have authority to 
enact substantive Jaw . . .. The fact that this Court has enacted a rule on 
the subject does not in itself determine that the subject matter is procedural 
and that it prevails over a conflicting statute. 
Id. at 543-44,700 P.2d at 946-47 (Bakes, J., dissenting). -
The issue of forfeiture of a bond is a matter of substantive law, rather than mere 
procedure. Former Idaho Code § 19-2927 governed the obligations of a surety under a 
bond by establishing the substantive right of a defendant or a surety to the return of the 
money posted for bail under certain, specific circumstances. "The obligation of a surety 
on a bond required by statute is determined by the provisions of the statute." 
Motors, Xnc. v. Am. states Ins. Cos., 118 Idaho 796, 798, 800 P.2d 683, 685 (Ct. App. 
1990). A statute dictating the obligations of a surety under a bond is not merely 
procedural "because a substantive right of the surety is at stake." State v. Valles, 143 
P.3d 496, 501 (N.M. Ct. App. -2004). In State v. Valles, the Court of Appeals of New 
Mexico addressed the issue of a statute that conflicted with a bail bond form prescribed 
by a court rule. d. at 498. The conflicting statute and court-prescribed form dealt with 
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the issue of when a bail bondsman's obligation under the bond ceased and thus when 
forfeiture of the bond could be implemented by the court. Id. at 497-98. The court held 
that this conflict involved a substantive issue and that the statute thus prevailed. Id. at 
463, 143 P.3d at 501; see also State v. Romero, 160 P.3d 914 (N.M. 2007) (recognizing, 
in its discussion of m, that the statute governing the forfeiture of bail bonds is not 
merely procedural because it gives a substantive right to the bail bondsman in having his 
obligations terminate at the time the defendant is found guilty). 
In addition, Idaho Code 5 19-2927 governed the substantive rights of the State to 
forfeiture of bonds. Allepheny Cas. Co. v. Roche Suretv, Inc., 885 So.2d 1016 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a Florida statute "affects substantive rights because it 
affects the counties' rights in forfeitable bail bonds" and "extinguishes a county's right to 
forfeiture of bonds"); State v. Jackson, 908 P.2d 1081, 1084 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) 
(noting that a State's underlying right to seek forfeiture of a bail bond is a substantive 
right, even though the time limits for a forfeiture action may be procedural.) 
Idaho Code 5 19-2927 "create[d], define[d], and regulateEd] primary rights" of the 
State, the defendant, and the surety with respect to forfeiture of bail bands, and it was 
therefore substantive in its content. m, 121 Idaho at 863-64, 828 P.2d at 892-93. 
The district court did not err in concluding that any conflict between former Idaho Code 5 
19-2927 and former Idaho Rule 46(g) involved substantive matters and that the statute 
therefore prevailed over the rule. 
/ I /  
I l l  
/ I /  
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D. The District Court Appropriately Exercised its Discretion in Denying Two 
Jinn's Motion to Reconsider Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture and Exonerate 
Bond 
"A decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration generally rests in the 
sound discretion of the trial court." S&a&, 145 Idaho at 71, 175 P.3d at 760. Two Jinn 
argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying Two Jinn's Motion to 
Reconsider Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture and Exonerate Bond on the basis that, 
according to Two Jinn, the court "failed to act consistently with applicable legal 
standards." Appellant's Brief, p. 12. Specifically, Two Jim asserts that the district court 
abused its discretion because the court interpreted former Idaho Criminal Rule 46(g) as 
subject to the specific conditions set forth in former Idaho Code § 19-2927. Id. 
The district court appropriately relied upon its initial ruling in denying Two Jinn's 
Motion for Reconsideration. R. 128; see also R. 96-101. As discussed above, the court's 
interpretation of Idaho Criminal Rule 46(g) and Idaho Code 5 19-2927 was reasonable 
and correct. Therefore, the court did not "fail[] to act consistently with applicable legal 
standards" and did not abuse its discretion in denying Two Jinn's Motion for 
Reconsideration, which failed to present any new information warranting the court's 
reconsideration of its decision. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court did not err in concluding that former Idaho Criminal Rule 46(g) 
did not mandate exoneration of the bond at issue in this appeal. Neither did the district 
court abuse its discretion in denying Two Jinn's Motion to Reconsider, as the court acted 
consistently with applicable legal standards in doing so. Accordingly, the State 
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respectfully requests that this Court uphold the district court's denial of Two Jim's 
Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture p d  Exonerate Bond and denial of Two Jim's Motion to 
Reconsider Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture and Exonerate Bond. 
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of August, 2009. 
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